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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

February 2, 1983

Dear Bill:

In National Security Decision Directive 53, the President provided guidance that the U.S. should seek active cooperation measures including on-site inspection to monitor compliance with a START treaty. Further, this action should be undertaken to the extent that reciprocal access to U.S. complexes is consistent with U.S. legal and security requirements.

The PFIAB strongly supports this position as we are sure you do. On balance, the U.S. may gain more than it will lose by opening up both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to on-site inspection. However, we are interested in the degree to which our specific military and intelligence requirements, coupled with the legal and security requirements, may limit our ability to propose an effective on-site inspection plan.

In view of this, we are requesting that you and Cap Weinberger undertake a study which will review on-site inspection including:

- Examination of the relevant sensitive U.S. facilities and their Soviet equivalents.
- Determination of what we might gain and lose by on-site inspection.
- Determination of the legal and social implications of "demand" inspections of private facilities in the U.S.
- Changes this could cause in our own conclusions if the on-site inspections were performed by third parties.

I believe that the results of such a study will greatly contribute to our work on START verification and compliance.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

*Anne*Anne Armstrong
Chairman

The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

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